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NOTES
CONSUMER PRODUCT WARRANTIES UNDER THE
MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT AND
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act' applies to sales of con-
sumer products and modifies the applicability and operation of the
warranties of quality of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial
Code.' Both consumers and suppliers of ordinary goods are af-
fected by the important and intricate changes arising from the
resulting body of law. This Note will examine the effects of these
modifications on planning sellers' consumer-product warranty ob-
ligations and resolving consumers" breach of warranty claims.
Although the UCC was promulgated primarily to govern mer-
cantile transactions, Article Two also controls consumer trans-
actions to the extent that it is neither displaced 3 by special state
I Title I of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter referred to as the Act]. With the
exception of § 102(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (Supp. V 1975) (standards for full and con-
spicuous disclosure of terms and conditions of written warranties on consumer products),
the Act became effective on July 4, 1975 (15 U.S.C § 2312(a) (Supp. V 1975)), but it does
not apply to products manufactured prior to that date (even if sold on or after that date)
(id.; Implementation and Enforcement Policy, pt. 1, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,721, 25,722 (1975)
[hereinafter referred to as Enforcement Policy]). Section 102(a) of the Act became effective
on June 30, 1976 (15 U.S.C. § 2312(b) (Supp. V 1975)), six months after the final publica-
tion of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) rules implementing that section. 16 C.F.R.
§§ 701.1-702.3 (1976). The FTC has taken the position that the Act is effective as to rebuilt
or replacement parts assembled or manufactured after July 4, 1975 (even if installed in
consumer products manufactured prior to that date). Proposed Interpretations § 700.2, 41
Fed. Reg. 34,654, 34,655 (1976) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 700.1-.12) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as Interpretations].
2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE [hereinafter referred to as UCC or the Code]. All cita-
tions to the UCC are to the 1972 Official Text, except where specific local departures from
that text are discussed.
The UCC has been adopted in 49 states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin
Islands. 1 U.L.A. 1 (Master ed. 1976). Louisiana recently adopted Articles One, Three,
Four, and Five with considerable local variation and amendment of the Official Text. LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:1-101 to 10:5-117 (West Supp. 1976). Each of the 51 enacting
jurisdictions has deviated from the Official Text of the Code to some extent. For a com-
prehensive, state-by-state compilation of nonuniform provisions, see UCC REP. SERV. (State
Correlation Tables). See note 31 infra.
' A subsequently enacted statute that is in pari materia must be considered concur-
rently with the relevant Code sections. See UCC § 1-104 (Construction Against Implicit
Repeal). Whenever possible, effect should be given to both statutes. E.g., Sterling Accep-
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consumer protection legislation 4 nor superseded by federal law. 5
Because it is aimed primarily at commercial transactions, the Code
is essentially suppletory, not regulatory. n As a result, the Code fills
in the gaps-open terms-in skeletal or incomplete contracts, 7 and
most of the substance of Article Two can be disclaimed or varied
by agreement of the parties.8 "Freedom of contract" is the general
rule under the UCC;9 regulation is the exception. 10 Therefore,
sellers can," and often do,' 2 drastically limit their warranty
tance Co. v. Grimes, 194 Pa. Super. Ct. 503, 509, 168 A.2d 600, 603 (1961) (UCC and prior
statute applicable). The Code shows an analogous resistance to judicial invalidation. See
UCC § 1-108 (Severability). Consumer protection legislation antedating the Code was ex-
pressly preserved by § 2-102. The scope of this saving clause is limited to Article Two.
4 The, most comprehensive example is California's Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty
Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1790-1795.7 (West 1973 & Supp. 1976). This law does not abrogate
the rights and obligations of the parties under the UCC except insofar as they are inconsis-
tent with its requirements, in which case the consumer law prevails. Id. § 1790.3 (West
1973). Two other states have similar laws. See KAN. STAT. §§ 50-623 to 643 (Cum. Supp.
1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325.951-.954 (West Cum. Supp. 1976). For analysis of the
California, Kansas, and Minnesota statutes, see Clark & Davis, Beefing Up Product Warran-
ties: A New Dimension In Consumer Protection, 23 U. KAN. L. REv. 567, 588-93, 594-97 (1975).
5 See, e.g., Clean Air Amendments of 1970, § 8(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-5a(a) (1970) (au-
tomobile manufacturers required to give new car buyers warranty that new cars meet fed-
eral emission control standards).
'See R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL AND
CONSUMER LAW 2-5 (2d ed. 1974).
"See, e.g., UCC § 2-305 (open price term); § 2-308 (absence of specified place for
delivery); § 2-309 (absence of specific time provisions); § 2-310 (open time for payment).
"See, e.g., UCC § 2-303 (allocation or division of risks); § 2-307 (delivery in single lot
or several lots); § 2-312(3) (warranty against infringement); § 2-316 (exclusion or modifica-
tion of warranties).
'See UCC § 1-102(3)-(4) & Comments 2 & 3.
10 Even those provisions of the Code that are basically "regulatory" can be manipulated
to a considerable extent. UCC § 1-102(3) provides, in part, that "the obligations of good
faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed ...."
But the impact of this section is substantially reduced by the following clause, which al-
lows parties to set the "standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be
measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable." Id. The obligation to refrain
from acting in an "unconscionable" manner (§§ 2-302, 2-719(3)) may not be disclaimed,
but conscionability is such a vague and malleable concept that it cannot be considered
"regulatory" in the ordinary sense. Only the duty of a warrantor to certain designated
third-party beneficiaries (§ 2-318) is-in some cases-truly "immutable." The draftsmen of
the Code have proposed three alternative versions of § 2-318. Alternatives A and B pro-
vide, in pertinent part, that a "seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this sec-
tion." However, Alternative C provides, in pertinent part, that a "seller may not exclude or
limit the operation of this section with respect to injury to the person of an individual to
whom the warranty extends," Ultimately, the regulatory effects of § 2-318 apply only when
a warranty has been made and has not been successfully disclaimed or excluded.
" A seller can exclude parol evidence of express warranties (UCC § 2-202), disclaim all
implied warranties (§ 2-316), modify or exclude warranties of title (§ 2-312(2)), "agree
otherwise" as to warranties against infringement (§ 2-312(3)), limit remedies (§§ 2-718,
2-719(1)-(2)), and limit or exclude consequential damages to the extent permitted by
§ 2-719(3). A seller may also be able to show by "clear affirmative proof" that a representa-
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liabilities under the Code. In most cases, "merchants"'13 are ex-
pected to have sufficient knowledge and bargaining power to pro-
tect themselves while shaping their own transactions. 4
Consumers usually do not have the expertise of merchants and
almost always lack an appreciable modicum of bargaining power
with respect to the substantive content of warranties. In fact, in the
typical case the consumer's first opportunity to read the terms of a
warranty occurs after the consummation of the sale, rather than
during the "bargaining."'15 Consumers, therefore, need the aid of
regulatory laws which impose obligations that cannot be disclaimed
or varied by the party with greater bargaining power, and which
compensate for consumers' ignorance. Although the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act purports to supply this much-needed pro-
tection, 16 it does not displace the UCC entirely; it is a veneer that
must be considered in conjunction with the Code. 7
tion that would otherwise create an express warranty was not retained as part ot the basis
of the bargian. UCC § 2-313, Comment 3.
12 H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7702, 7710.
13 UCC § 2-104(1) defines "merchant" as
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods in-
volved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by
his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupa-
tion holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
'4 See, e.g., id. §§ 1-201(19), 1-203, 2-103(1)(b) (requirement of good faith); §§ 1-201
(10), 2-316(2) (conspicuity); §§ 2-302, 2-719(3) (obligation to refrain from acting in an uncon-
scionable manner). These requirements, among others, are thought to afford sufficient
protection to merchant-buyers.
15 See, e.g., Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68 N.J. 1, 5, 342 A.2d 181, 183 (1975).
16 Suppliers of consumer products are not compelled to make warranties under the
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(2)-(3) (Supp. V 1975). The Act attempts to induce suppliers to
warrant the quality of their wares through increased competition and enhanced consumer
awareness and understanding of warranties. See id. § 2302(a). See also H.R. REP. No. 1107,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7702,
7702. To this end, suppliers must comply with sophisticated disclosure and designation
requirements. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302(a)-(b), 2303(a) (Supp. V 1975); 16 C.F.R. §§ 701.1-702.3
(1976). See notes 73 & 133 infra. In addition, the power to disclaim or otherwise modify im-
plied warranties is virtually eliminated when the transaction involves "written warranties"
or "service contracts." See notes 70-81 and accompanying text infra.
17 The more parochial effects of the Act on local nonuniform amendments to the
warranty (and related) sections of the Code are not discussed in this Note. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE tit. 7A, § 2-316(5) (1966); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 11, § 2-316(5) (Cum. Supp. 1976); MD.
CoNi. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-316.1 (1975); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-316A (Lawyers
Co-op 1976); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 72.8010-.8200 (1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-316(5)
(Cum. Supp. 1976); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-316(4) (Supp. 1975); W. VA. CODE
§ 46A-6-107 (1976). This Note also does not discuss in detail the interaction of the Act and
more comprehensive state consumer warranty laws (see note 4 supra) or other extra-Code
state law (see, e.g., Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Dist. Ct. App.), aff'd per curiam, 264 So. 2d
418 (Fla. 1972) (warranty on realty not covered by UCC Article Two).
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JUXTAPOSITION OF THE MAGNUSON-MOSS
WARRANTY ACT AND THE UCC
A. Scope
The scope of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act18 is narrower
than the scope of the warranties of quality under Article Two of
the Uniform Commercial Code.' 9 The Act is limited to "sales"
20 of
"consumer products,"' 21 but, "[u]nless the context otherwise re-
IS Because the Act lacks a "scope provision" comparable to UCC § 2-102 (and related
provisions) the extent of its applicability must be determined by referring to its definitional
provisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (Supp. V 1975). Further guidance may be found in the
FTC's Proposed Interpretations, 41 Fed. Reg. 34,654 (1976) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R.
§§ 700.1-.12 (partially superseding Enforcement Policy announced in 40 Fed. Reg. 25,721
(1975))). See also Modification of Implementation and Enforcement Policy, 41 Fed. Reg.
26,757 (1976). The Interpretations
are intended to clarify the requirements of the Act for consumers, manufacturers,
importers, distributors and retailers. They are not, however, substantive rules, and
do not have the force or effect of statutory provisions; like industry guides, they
are advisory in nature. Failure to comply with them, however, may result in cor-
rective action by the Commission under the applicable statutory provisions.
41 Fed. Reg. 34,654, 34,654 (1976).
19 UCC § 2-313 (express warranties by affirmations of fact, promises, descriptions,
samples, or models); § 2-314 (implied warranty of merchantability and other implied war-
ranties that may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade); § 2-315 (implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose). As to the effects of the Act on UCC § 2-312 (warranties
of tide and against infringement), see notes 64-69 and accompanying text infra.
2 0 See 15 U.S.C § 2301(6)(A)-(B), (7) (Supp. V 1975). Professors Clark and Davis have
suggested that the Act may extend to leases of consumer products. Clark & Davis, supra
note 4, at 607 n.253. Their argument rests on the language in the Act defining a "sup-
plier" and, therefore, a "warrantor" as "any person engaged in the business of making a
consumer product directly or indirectly available to consumers." 15 U.S.C. § 2301(4) (Supp.
V 1975) (emphasis added). See id. § 2301(5) (defining "warrantor"). This completely
ignores the explicit definition of both "written" and "implied" warranties as being given
in connection with the "sale" of a consumer product. Id. § 2301(6)(A)-(B), (7).
21 See 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(A)-(B), (7) (Supp. V 1975). The term "consumer product" is
defined as
any tangible personal property which is distributed in commerce and which is
normally used for personal, family, or household purposes (including any such
property intended to be attached to or installed in any real property without re-
gard to whether it is so attached or installed).
Id. § 2301(1). Congress specifically excluded seed for planting. Id. § 2311(a)(2); cf. Desert
Seed Co. v. Drew Farmers Supply, Inc., 248 Ark. 858, 454 S.W.2d 307 (1970) (breach of
express warranty by description on bag of seeds). Except for § 102(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2302(c)
(Supp. V 1975) (see note 78 and accompanying text infra), the Act does not apply to written
warranties otherwise governed by federal law. 15 U.S.C. § 2311(d) (Supp. V 1975). See
note 5 and accompanying text supra. The FTC may also exclude certain products from the
coverage of the Act. For example, since "no appreciable portion of new aircraft are sold to
consumers, for personal, family or household use" (Modification of Implemention and
Enforcement Policy, 41 Fed. Reg. 26,757 (1976)), the FTC has taken the position that
"general aviation aircraft are not among the products whose users Congress intended to
protect under the Act's regulatory scheme for consumer product warranties." Id. This ap-
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quires," the Code embraces "transactions in goods. '2 2 There are
five significant distinctions. First, by using the term "transactions"
in the scope provision of an article concerned primarily with
sales, 23 the draftsmen of the Code probably intended the Code
to apply to commercial dealings that are not sales in the strict
sense.24 Indeed, a number of courts apply the Code's warranty
and related sections to a variety of nonsales transactions, particu-
larly chattel leases.25 Second, the Article Two warranties apply to
all "goods" whether they are "consumer goods" or not.26 Third,
proach follows an objective reading of the definition of "consumer product"; products not
normally used as consumer products are not covered by the Act, even though in a particu-
lar case a consumer owns the product and puts it to a personal, family, or household use.
See generally Interpretations, supra note 1, § 700.1, 41 Fed. Reg. 34,654-55 (1976); Enforce-
ment Policy, pt. 2, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,721, 25,722 (1975).
Unlike the UCC (see note 26 infra), the Act is concerned only with the characteristics of
the product, not those of the buyer. However, this is not necessarily the case with the rules
promulgated under the Act. Under the rules, the character of the buyer, not the product,
may determine the applicability of the rules. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 702.1(b) (1976) (exempts
products purchased solely for commercial or industrial use from the requirements of 16
C.F.R. §§ 702.1-.3 (1976) (relating to Pre-Sale Availability of Written Warranty Terms)).
This, too, highlights the objective nature of the test for a consumer product under the Act:
even though a product is used commercially or industrially in a particular instance, it is a
consumer product within the meaning of § 101(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (Supp. V 1975), if it
is normally used for personal, family, or household purposes. But, of course, nothing in the
Act compels a supplier to offer written warranties on consumer products destined for com-
mercial or industrial use.
Although § 102(b)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1975), clearly states that
the FTC "shall" prescribe rules requiring pre-sale availability of the terms of written war-
ranties on consumer products, such terms must be disclosed only to the extent required by
the rules of the Commission. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (Supp. V 1975). The FTC's position is
that any ambiguity or doubt as to coverage under the Act will be resolved in favor of
coverage. Interpretations, supra note 1, § 700. l(b), 41 Fed. Reg. 34,654 (1976).
22 UCC § 2-102.
2 3 See id. § 2-101 & Comment.
24 The Code is "drawn to provide flexibility so that, since it is intended to be a semi-
permanent piece of legislation, it will provide its own machinery for expansion of commer-
cial practices." UCC § 1-102, Comment 1. "[W]arranties need not be confined either to
sales contracts or to the direct parties to such a contract." Id. § 2-313, Comment 2. See id.
§ 1-102(1), (2)(a)-(b).
25 See Davenport, Recent Developments Under Article 2-Sales, 4 U.C.C.L.J. 238-41 (1972);
Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions-Implied Warranties and Strict Liability
in Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 661; Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 447, 449-54, 464-72 (1971); Annet., 48
A.L.R.3d 668 (1973); Comment, Sale of Goods In Service-Predominated Transactions, 37
FORDHAM L. REV. 115 (1968). See also Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality In Non-Sales
Cases, 57 CoLuM. L. REV. 653 (1957); Comment, Sales-Service Hybrid Transactions: A Policy
Approach, 28 Sw. L.J. 575 (1974).
11 Under the Code, "goods" are "consumer goods" if "they are used or bought for use
primarily for personal, family or household purposes." UCC § 9-109(l). This definition is
applicable to Article Two. § 2-103(3). Arguably, the entire taxonomy of "goods" in § 9-109
is applicable to Article Two by virtue of § 2-103(3), but it will be sufficient for Article Two
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Article Two recognizes a goods-fixtures distinction,2 7 but the Act
does not.28 Fourth, the test for "consumer products" under the Act
is objective, while the test for "consumer goods" under the Code is
subjective.2 9 Fifth, sales of consumer products must affect inter-
state commerce to come within the purview of the Act;30 the UCC
lacks such a requirement.
31
warranty purposes to distinguish between consumer goods and nonconsumer goods. The
chief importance of the designation of goods as "consumer goods" for Article Two pur-
poses is that "[l]imitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of
consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable ...." § 2-719(3). In addition, the standards
applicable to consumer-buyers may differ from those applicable to merchant-buyers-even
when the goods are not "consumer goods." Courts may be more prone to find the seller's
behavior unconscionable (§ 2-302) or lacking in "good faith" (§§ 1-201(19), 1-203 & Com-
ment, 2-103(I)(b)) in cases involving a consumer-buyer. Whether the buyer's behavior is
"reasonable" may depend on whether he is a consumer or a merchant. See, e.g.,
§ 2-607(3)(a) & Comment 4; cf. § 1-204(2) (reasonableness of time for taking any action
depends upon nature, purpose, and circumstances of such action).
27See id. § 2-105(1) (definition of "goods"). Section 2-107(2) sweeps certain things "at-
tached to realty and capable of severance without material harm thereto" into the defini-
tion of goods when there is a contract for their "sale apart from the land." Fixtures incor-
porated into buildings that are for sale are not goods. See, e.g., Foster v. Colorado Radio
Corp., 381 F.2d 222, 225-26 (10th Cir. 1967) (UCC not applicable to radio station trans-
mission equipment).
28See 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (Supp. V 1975), set forth in note 21 supra. However,
whether implied warranties covering fixtures arise under state law is a question governed
by extra-Code law. See Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Dist. Ct. App.), aff'd per curiam, 264
So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1972). See note 17 supra.
2'9 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (Supp. V 1975), with UCC §§ 9-109(1), 2-103(3). The
significance of this distinction is greatest in those occasional cases where the goods will be
"goods" for the purposes of Article Two but will not be "consumer products" for purposes
of the Act (e.g., the "family bulldozer" or a "personal submarine"). See note 21 supra; cf.
Modification of Implementation and Enforcement Policy, 41 Fed. Reg. 26,757 (1976) (de-
termination respecting small aircraft). In these cases, the Code will apply but the Act will
not. The reverse is also possible. In cases where the goods are normally bought for per-
sonal, family, or household purposes but not actually bought for such a purpose (e.g., an
automobile bought for use in business), the Act will apply, but Article Two's special treat-
ment of "consumer goods" (see note 26 supra) will not. Compare Interpretations, supra note
1, § 700.1(b), 41 Fed. Reg. 34,654 (1976), with UCC §§ 9-109(l)-(2), 2-103(3).
so 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1), (13)-(14) (Supp. V 1975). Because almost anything affects
interstate commerce (see, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975)), very few, if
any, warrantors will be excluded from the coverage of the Act on the basis of this limita-
tion.
31 Whenever the transaction in question "bears a reasonable relation" to more than one
jurisdiction, possible conflict-of-laws problems arise. UCC § 1-105. Despite its name, the
Code is not "uniform," and has not produced uniform results among the enacting jurisdic-
tions. Four factors are responsible for this failure. First, § 1-103, among others, sweeps a great
deal of nonuniform state law into the Code. Second, despite the command of § 1-102(1),
(2)(c), that the UCC be construed "to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions,"
the Code is subject to divergent construction in the various courts of the 51 enacting juris-
dictions. Compare Fairchild Indus. v. Maritime Air Serv., Ltd., 274 Md. 181, 333 A.2d 313
(1975) (§ 2-316(2) conspicuity requirement imposed on "as is" disclaimers under §
2-316(3)(a)), with DeKalb Agresearch, Inc. v. Abbott, 391 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ala. 1974)
1977]
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B. Warranty Types
The Code sales warranties32 include express warranties, 33 im-
plied warranties of "merchantability" 34 and "fitness for [a] particu-
lar purpose,"35 "other implied warranties [which] may arise from
course of dealing or usage of trade,"36 warranties of title,37 and
warranties against infringement.3" The Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act deals with "written warranties," 39 "implied warranties, 114 and
"service contracts. ' 41 "Written warranties" under the Act has a nar-
rower meaning than "express warranties" under the Code. Section
101(6) of the Act 42 provides:
The term "written warranty" means-
(A) any written affirmation of fact or written promise
made in connection with the sale of a consumer product by a
(§ 2-316(3)(a) literally construed), aff'd per curiam, 511 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1975). Third,
the Code contains a number of optional alternative provisions. E.g., UCC § 2-318(A), (B),
(C). Fourth, and perhaps most significant, each of the 51 enacting jurisdictions has subjected
the Code to a variety of nonuniform amendments. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMZERS,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3 (1972). See note 2
supra. The warranty sections of Article Two are no exception. See, e.g., statutes cited in
note 17 supra.
32 For an extensive discussion of the Code warranties, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 31, §§ 9-1 to 9-12.
33 UCC § 2-313.
34 Id. § 2-314(1)-(2).
35 Id. § 2-315.
36 1d. § 2-314(3).
37 1d. § 2-312(1).
38 1 d. § 2-312(3).
9 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301(6) (definition), 2302-2304 (Supp. V 1975).
40 See, e.g., id. §§ 2301(7) (definition), 2304(a)(2), (a)(3), 2308(a)-(b).
41 See, e.g., id. §§ 2301(8) (definition), 2306, 2308 (a)-(b). See note 75 ii~fra. The FTC
takes the position that to the extent that "service contracts" are regulated under state insur-
ance laws, the Act does not apply. Interpretations supra note 1, § 700.11(a), 41 Fed. Reg.
34,654, 34,656 (1976); see McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1970).
The Attorney General of the State of New York, in an opinion concerning doing
business as an insurance company without a license, recently stated that the distinction
between a warranty and an insurance contract relates to the element of "fortuitousness." A
manufacturer, retailer, or repairer of a product has "sufficient control" over its proper
operation to issue a warranty without being deemed to be an insurer. However, a third
party, not a manufacturer, retailer, or repairer, who issues a so-called warranty for a
period of time covering free parts and free service is doing an insurance business because
that party lacks sufficient control to eliminate the element of fortuitousness. See 87 INS.
ADVOCATE No. 34, at 4 (1976). Suppliers of oil used for residential heating purposes are
the paradigm example. Often a contract for the sale of oil entitles the buyer to protection
against oil burner breakdowns, even where the supplier of oil is not the supplier of the
particular heating equipment. Id.
42 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) (Supp. V 1975). The following definitional cross-references are
relevant: § 2301(1) ("consumer product"); § 2301(4) ("supplier"); § 2301(10) ("remedy");
§ 2301(11) ("replacement"); § 2301(12) ("refund").
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supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature of the mate-
rial or workmanship and affirms or promises that such mate-
rial or workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified
level of performance over a specified period of time, or
(B) any undertaking in writing in connection with the
sale by a supplier of a consumer product to refund, repair,
replace, or take other remedial action with respect to such
product in the event that such product fails to meet the
specifications set forth in the undertaking,
which written affirmation, promise, or undertaking becomes part
of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer for
purposes other than resale of such product.
Although the "basis of the bargain" requirement is common to
the Act and the Code,43 there are a number of important distinc-
tions. First, oral representations may create express warranties
under the UCC;44 the Act governs only "written affirmation[s] of
fact or written promise[s] ' 45 and "undertaking[s] in writing.
46
Second, representations giving rise to express warranties under the
Code may be in the form of affirmations of fact, promises, descrip-
tions, samples, or models, 47 but the Act recognizes only affirma-
tions of fact, promises, and undertakings. 48 Thus, because the Act
does not "invalidate or restrict any right or remedy of any con-
sumer under State law,"49 consumers still have the benefits of any
express warranties that arise under the UCC. Third, the written
warranties described in section 10 1(6)(A) must relate to the "nature
of the material or workmanship" and must affirm or promise that
such material or workmanship is either "defect free" or that it will
''meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of
time." 50 Conceivably, some written express warranties arising from
affirmations of fact or promises will not meet these requirements,
but they will be within the ambit of UCC section 2-313(1)(a).
43 See UCC § 2-313(l); 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) (Supp. V 1975).
" See, e.g., Fred J. Miller, Inc. v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 265 Md. 523, 290 A.2d
527 (1972).
45 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
46 Id. § 230 1(6)(B). Warranties created by "undertakings" have no direct counterpart in
the UCC. Discussion of this feature of the Act appears in the text accompanying notes
98-104 infra.
47 UCC § 2-313(1).
48 15 U.S.C § 2301(6) (Supp. V 1975).
49 Id. § 231 l(b)(1). The definition of "remedy" in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(10) (Supp. V 1975)
has no relevance to the intended meaning of "remedy" as it is used in § 2311(b)(1). The
draftsmen obviously meant 'judicial remedies" in § 2311(b)(1). 15 U.S.C. § 2301(10) is set
forth in note 84 infra.
50 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
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Fourth, although advertising or labels and tags may create express
warranties under the UCC,51 written warranties under the Act
must be made "in connection with the sale of a consumer
product. '52 Whether advertising bears a close enough relationship
to particular sales to create written warranties under the Act is, at
best, doubtful. Although closer both in time and space to particular
sales, labels and tags cause many practical problems, such as desig-
nating warranties as either "full" or "limited." 3 Congress probably
did not intend to include them within the coverage of the Act.
54
Fifth, section 103(b) of the Act exempts from the operation of
the Act's three major sections 55 "expressions of general policy con-
cerning customer satisfaction" if they "are not subject to any
specific limitations." Such statements may, however, create rights
under section 110 of the Act5 6 and section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act; 57 the Code lacks a direct counterpart.
Despite all these differences, when there is a substantial fed-
eral claim under the Act, consumers may be able to litigate their
related UCC claims in federal court on the basis of pendent
51 See, e.g., Swenson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 234 N.W.2d 38 (S.D. 1975) (labels);
Huebert v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 208 Kan. 720, 494 P.2d 1210 (1972) (advertisements).
52 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(A) (Supp. V 1975). See id. § 2301(6)(B).
-1 See notes 70-73 and accompanying text infra.
54 The FTC has taken the position that
[c]ertain representations, such as energy efficiency ratings for electrical appliances,
care labeling of wearing apparel and other product information disclosures may
be express warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code. However, these dis-
closures alone are not written warranties under this Act. Section 101(6) [15 U.S.C.
§ 2301(6)] provides that a written affirmation of fact or a written promise of a
specified level of performance must relate to a specified period of time in order to
be considered a "written warranty". A product information disclosure without a
specified time period to which the disclosure relates is therefore not a written
warranty.... The Commission encourages the disclosure of product information
which is not deceptive and which may benefit consumers, and will not construe the
Act to impede information disclosure in product advertising or labeling.
Interpretations, supra note 1, § 700.3(a), 41 Fed. Reg. 34,654, 34,655 (1976) (footnote
omitted) (emphasis added). There is further evidence that Congress did not intend labels
and advertising to create written warranties since the Act directs the FTC to establish
rules regarding the availability of the warranty itself under § 102(b)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1975), but merely grants the Commission discretion to establish
rules for the presentation of information about those terms in advertising, labeling, and
similar materials under § 102(b)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
55 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302-2304 (Supp. V 1975).
56 Id. § 2310 (unfair methods of competition outlawed). See Interpretations, supra note
1, § 700.5(a), 41 Fed. Reg. 34,654, 34,655 (1976); notes 142-62 and accompanying textinfra.
"' 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. V 1975), See Interpretations, supra note 1, § 700.5(a), 41 Fed.
Reg. 34,654, 34,655 (1976). The FTC has stated that, in order to enjoy the § 103(b) ex-
emption, the warrantor must maintain a general policy "concerning customer satisfaction"
with respect to all its products. Id. § 700.5(b).
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jurisdiction, 58 subject to the prerequisites for cognizance of the
federal claim.5 9 Typically, all such breach of warranty claims will
arise out of a "common nucleus of operative fact"-the sine qua
non of pendent jurisdiction.60
The Act defines an "implied warranty" in section 101(7)61 as
"an implied warranty arising under State law (as modified by sec-
tions 108 and 104(a)) in connection with the sale by a supplier of a
consumer product." The modifications relate to impairment of the
power of disclaimer 62 and the power to limit the duration of im-
plied warranties that have not been effectively disclaimed.63
Sections 104 and 108 of the Act,64 in addition to modifying the
state law definition of implied warranty under the Act, regulate the
substantive terms and effect of both express and implied warran-
ties. The impact of these sections on warranties of tide and warran-
ties against infringement is unclear, however, because nothing in
the text of UCC section 2-312 categorizes such warranties as "ex-
press" or "implied." Section captions are part of the Code,6 5 and
thus can aid in its construction, but, unlike UCC sections 2-313,
2-314, and 2-315, the caption to section 2-312 does not desig-
nate the warranties it covers as express or implied. Although
Comment 6 to section 2-312 states that the warranty of title cannot
be disclaimed under UCC section 2-316(3) because it is not desig-
nated as an implied warranty, Professors White and Summers have
pointed out that this Comment concerns only the method of dis-
claimer, not the character of the warranty. 66 "In practical effect,
the warranty of title may be regarded as implied since it need not
be expressed. '6 7 Neither the Comments to UCC section 2-312 nor
White and Summers specifically take a position on the characteriza-
tion of the warranty against infringement. No reported case dis-
cusses any aspect of this problem. In the final analysis, despite the
expression "any implied warranty" in sections 104(a) and 108(a) of
" See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). Although a pendent state
law claim will not necessarily fall if the parent claim is dismissed, there must be a plausible
federal claim at the outset. Id.
59 The jurisdictional requirements in consumer product warranty cases are spelled out
in 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (Supp. V 1975).
60 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
61 15 U.S.C. § 2301(7) (Supp. V 1975). The following definitional cross-references are
relevant: § 2301(1) ("consumer product"); § 2301(4) ("supplier"); § 2301(15) ("state law").
62 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (Supp. V 1975).
63 Id. §§ 2304(a)(2), 2308(a)-(b).
64 1d. §§ 2304, 2308.
65 UCC § 1-109.
66 j. WHITE & R. SUNIMERS, supra note 31, § 9-10 & n.100.
6 7 1d. § 9-10 n.100.
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the Act,68 a court faced with the issue might emphasize that the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is primarily concerned with warran-
ties of quality, and thus hold that the operation of section 104 and
108 are limited to warranties arising under UCC sections 2-314
and 2-315. In addition, there is nothing in the legislative history to
indicate that a construction embracing section 2-312 was intended.
On the other hand, the draftsmen could have used the expression
"warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose,
or other implied warranties arising from course of dealing or
usage of trade," instead of "any implied warranty," if that is what
they intended. Finally, the policy of the Act is to give consumers a
meaningful bundle of warranty rights. It would be odd to improve
the warranties of quality and leave room for the supplier to deny
good tide. In the end this may prove to be a tempest in a teapot;
there are only a few reported cases in which the buyer of consumer
goods sued the seller for breach of the warranty of title or the war-
ranty against infringement.
69
C. Disclaimers, Designations, Damages, and Remedies
There is no obligation to give a written warranty under the
Act.70 If a supplier so chooses, he may give a "full (statement of
duration) warranty" 71 or a "limited warranty" 72 or both.73 Section
68 15 U.S.C. §§ 2304(a), 2308(a) (Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added).
69 See, e.g., Jones v. Linebaugh, 34 Mich. App. 305, 191 N.W.2d 142 (1971) (seller's
disclaimer under UCC § 2-312(2) held insufficient).
71 See 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(2)-(3) (Supp. V 1975).
71 Id. § 2303(a)(1). For example, the warrantor may indicate that the product is cov-
ered by a "full two-year warranty."72 Id. § 2303(a)(2). Like full warranties, limited warranties may be for a stated duration
only. Enforcement Policy, pt. 3, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,721, 25,722 (1975). The obligation to des-
ignate warranties as "full" or "limited" applies only to products that actually cost the con-
sumer more than $10. 15 U.S.C. § 2303(d) (Supp. V 1975).
73 15 U.S.C. § 2305 (Supp. V 1975). This section evidently contemplates a "full" war-
ranty on some parts of a complex consumer product and a "limited" warranty on others.
Efforts to divide warranties into full and limited warranties on a chronological basis-for
example, a "full one-year warranty" followed by a "two-year limited warranty" on the same
consumer product-would run afoul of the provision of the Act that eliminates the
power to limit the duration of implied warranties if a full warranty is given. See notes
82-97 and accompanying text infra. However, if no limitation on the duration of the im-
plied warranty is attempted, then a limited warranty might properly follow a full warranty
on a particular consumer product or part.
The terms "full (statement of duration) warranty" and "limited warranty" (or "(state-
ment of duration) limited warranty") are the exclusive designations a warrantor may use
under § 103(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a) (Supp. V 1975), unless the FTC, by rule, creates an
exception under § 103(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2303(c). See Interpretations, supra note 1, § 700.6(a),
41 Fed. Reg. 34,654, 34,655 (1976). The obligation to designate applies only if the con-
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108(a) of the Act"4 provides that if any written warranty is given, or
if the supplier enters into a service contract 75 with the consumer
within ninety days of the time of the sale, there can be no dis-
claimer of implied warranties. In addition, this triggers the Act's
disclosure and designation requirements. 76 Further, the supplier
loses the power to condition the warranty on the consumer's use
-in connection with the warranted product-of other products or
services identified by a brand, trade, or corporate name, unless
such products or services are provided to the consumer free of
charge. 7 The Federal Trade Commission, however, has power to
sumer product actually costs the consumer more than $10, exclusive of taxes. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2303(d) (Supp. V 1975); Interpretations, supra note 1, § 700.6(a), 41 Fed. Reg. 34,654,
34,655 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7702, 7719. It appears that the terms "guaranty" and "guaran-
tee" should no longer be used for the purpose of designation. See Enforcement Policy, pt.
5, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,721-22 (1975).
74 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (Supp. V 1975).
7' The term "service contract" is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(8) (Supp. V 1975) as: "a
contract in writing to perform, over a fixed period of time or for a specified duration,
services relating to the maintenance or repair (or both) of a consumer product." The FTC
adds this analysis:
An agreement which would meet the definition of written warranty in Section
101(6)(A) or (B) [15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(A) or (B)] but for its failure to satisfy the
basis of the bargain test is a service contract. For example, an agreement which
calls for some consideration in addition to the purchase price of the consumer
product, or which is entered into at some date after the purchase of the consumer
product to which it applies, is a service contract. An agreement which relates only
to the performance of maintenance and/or inspection services and which is not an
undertaking, promise or affirmation with respect to a specified level of perfor-
mance, or that the product is free of defects in materials or workmanship, is a
service contract. An agreement to perform periodic cleaning and inspection of a
product over a specified period of time, even when offered at the time of sale and
without charge to the consumer, is an example of such a service contract.
Interpretations, supra note 1, § 700.11(c), 41 Fed. Reg. 34,654, 34,656-57 (1976). Such
service contracts have no analogue in the Code. The Act's draftsmen wisely anticipated that
crafty sellers of consumer products might try to circumvent the warranty provisions by
offering only service contracts to consumers. Service contracts may still be used in conjunc-
tion with or in lieu of written warranties (15 U.S.C. § 2306(b) (Supp. V 1975)), but the
service contractor has no right to disclaim implied warranties or limit their duration if he
gives only a service contract (id. § 2308(a)-(b)).
It is not clear whether the duration of implied warranties may be limited when a
service contract is combined with a limited warranty. Entering into a service contract within
90 days of the sale triggers 15 U.S.C. § 230 8 (a)(2), but the use of a limited warranty brings
into operation § 2308(b) with its requirement of "reasonable duration." Perhaps a supplier
must wait until the expiration of 90 days from the time of the sale before entering into a
service contract in order to avoid § 2308(a)(2). However, whether a 90-day limited war-
ranty lasts for a sufficiently "reasonable" duration to satisfy § 2808(b) is not clear and may
vary among products.
76 As to the Act's mandatory disclosure provisions, see notes 133-34 and accompanying
text infra. The designation requirement is discussed in note 73 supra.
77 15 U.S.C. § 2302(c) (Supp. V 1975); see Interpretations, supra note 1, § 700.10, 41
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:738
grant exceptions in proper cases. 78 If a supplier either makes a
Fed. Reg. 34,654, 34,656 (1976); note 85 infra. This rule applies only to products that cost
the consumer more than $5. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(e) (Supp. V 1975). A limited warranty may
provide for free replacement of defective parts without covering the cost of necessary
labor. See Interpretations, supra note 1, § 700. 10(b), 41 Fed. Reg. 34,654, 34,656 (1976); cf.
15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975) (warrantor must remedy defect within reasonable
time and "without charge"). The FTC takes the position that under such a limited war-
ranty no condition requiring the consumer to purchase the necessary services from any
particular person or business can be imposed. Interpretations, supra note 1, § 700. 10(a)-(b),
41 Fed. Reg. 34,654, 34,656 (1976). Further, no warrantor may condition the continued
validity of a warranty on the use of authorized service or authorized replacement parts for
nonwarranty maintenance. Id. § 700. 10(c). See also id. § 700. 10(d). The FTC is of the opin-
ion that this violates the Act's proscription of product or service tie-in arrangements, and
also constitutes a deceptive warranty practice under § 110(c)(2) of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2310(c)(2) (Supp. V 1975) "because a warrantor cannot, as a matter of law, avoid liability
under a written virranty where a defect is unrelated to the use by a consumer of 'unau-
thorized' articles or service." Interpretations, supra note 1, § 700.10(c), 41 Fed. Reg. 34,654,
34,656 (1976). However, the warrantor can exclude and deny liability for defects or dam-
age caused by such "unauthorized" articles or service. Id. Finally, the Act's anti-tie-in rules
do not repeal, supersede, or invalidate the Federal Trade Commission Act or any other
federal law defined therein as an antitrust law. 15 U.S.C. § 2311(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
78 15 U.S.C. § 2302(c) (Supp. V 1975) provides that the FTC may waive the prohibi-
tion against conditioning a warranty upon the customer's use of an identified product or
service if:
(1) the warrantor satisfies the Commission that the warranted product will
function properly only if the article or service so identified is used in connection
with the warranted product, and
(2) the Commission finds that such a waiver is in the public interest.
That section further specifies the procedure the FTC must follow in disposing of such
applications for waivers. The nature of the application procedure is detailed in Enforce-
ment Policy, pt. 10, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,721, 25,723 (1975). Applicants may request that
documents they submit remain confidential. Id. In considering applications the Commis-
sion may invite other parties to submit comments and opinions. Id.
Thus far, Sohmer & Co., Inc. (manufacturer of pianos), Harmsco, Inc. (manufacturer
of swimming pool equipment), and Coleman Co., Inc. (manufacturer of heating and cool-
ing equipment for mobile homes) have made the only three applications. 40 Fed. Reg.
49,409-10 (1975); id. at 58,698; 41 Fed. Reg. 53,708 (1976). The FTC denied the Sohmer ap-
plication on the ground that the applicant had failed to meet its burden of proof on the
necessity of a tie-in. 41 Fed. Reg. 17,821 (1976). Harmsco's application was denied because
the exhibits it submitted were not responsive to the proper issues. 41 Fed. Reg. 34,368
(1976). First, Harmsco showed that its products, swimming pool filters used in conjunction
with Harmsco's replaceable cartridges, were superior to other methods of filtration, not
other brands of filter cartridges. Second, the FTC took the position that the "proper func-
tioning" standard does not necessarily require the "best functioning" of the product. Thus,
merely showing superior performance when the warranted product is used in connection
with the tied-in product is insufficient to satisfy the standard. The applicant must show
that the warranted product does not work properly without the tied-in product; consumers
are entitled to accept less than optimal performance of the warranted product if they so
choose. Finally, the Commission took the position that, even though a tie-in by a brand,
trade, or corporate name is generally not permissible under the Act, the warrantor may
specify particular "objective specifications" for products used in conjunction with the war-
ranted products, as long as such specifications are "reasonably related" to the warranted
product's performance and are not merely a disguise for an illegal tie-in. Id. The Coleman
application was still pending when this issue went to press.
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"full warranty" or enters into a service contract with a consumer in
lieu of a written warranty within ninety days of the sale, no limit
may be imposed upon the duration of implied warranties. 79 If the
written warranty is "limited," then a supplier may, under certain
circumstances, be able to limit the duration of implied warranties.
80
Any attempted disclaimer, modification, or limitation made in vio-
lation of section 108 is deemed to be ineffective for purposes of the
Act and state law.8 '
To make a "full warranty," a warrantor must either voluntarily
comply with the federal minimum standards for warranty in sec-
tion 104 of the Act82 or designate his warranty as a "full warranty,"
in which case it is automatically deemed to incorporate at least the
federal minimum standards.8 3 The federal minimum standards
consist of five elements. First, the warrantor must, as a minimum,
"remedy"8' 4 any breach of warranty "without charge"8 5 and within a
79 15 U.S.C. §§ 2304(a)(2), 2308(a) (Supp. V 1975).
" Id. § 2308(b). The duration of implied warranties may be limited to the duration of
a "limited" written warranty if: (1) that duration is reasonable; (2) such a limitation is not
unconscionable; (3) the limitation is set forth in "clear and unmistakable language"; and (4)
the language is "prominently displayed on the face of the warranty." Id. Until some case
law on the subject develops, the minimum limits of a "reasonable duration" will remain
uncertain. The FTC is not expressly empowered to establish rules on this matter. See id.
§ 2302(b)(2)-(3). The third and fourth requirements are subject to FTC rulemaking power.
Id. § 2302(a)(6); 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(7) (1976). The fourth requirement is probably some-
what stricter than "conspicuity" because the information must actually appear on the face
of the warranty. UCC disclaimers may be "conspicuous" even when printed on the reverse
side of a contract document if appropriate indications are printed on the front. Childers &
Venters, Inc. v. Sowards, 460 S.W.2d 343 (Ky. 1970). See UCC § 1-201(10).
81 15 U.S.C. § 2308(c) (Supp. V 1975). This is an added incentive for suppliers to
comply with the Act: the consumer may immediately sue on his UCC claim without first
exhausting any mandatory informal dispute resolution process and the supplier's disclaim-
ers would be totally ineffective. See notes 182-84 and accompanying text infra.
82 15 U.S.C. § 2304 (Supp. V 1975).
83 Id. § 2304(e). This is so, in the opinion of the FTC, even where the product does
not actually cost the consumer more than $10. Enforcement Policy, pt. 3, 40 Fed. Reg.
25,721, 25,722 (1975). See also 15 U.S.C. § 2303(d) (Supp. V 1975).
84 15 U.S.C. § 2301(10) (Supp. V 1975) provides:





except that the warrantor may not elect refund unless (i) the warrantor is unable
to provide replacement and repair is not commercially practicable or cannot be
timely made, or (ii) the consumer is willing to accept such refund.
The term "replacement" is defined as "furnishing a new consumer product which is identi-
cal or reasonably equivalent to the warranted&.consumer product." Id. § 2301(1 1). The term
"refund" means "refunding the actual purchase price (less reasonable depreciation based
on actual use where permitted by rules of the [FTC])." Id. § 2301(12). The FTC has pro-
posed a rule to be entitled "Calculation of Depreciation Deduction For Refunds Under
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reasonable time.8 6 A warrantor may designate an agent or rep-
resentative to perform warranty services or fulfill warranty obliga-
tions, but such persons do not become cowarrantors1 7 Further,
such a designation does not relieve a warrantor of his direct and
primary obligation to the consumer, and it is the warrantor's duty
and burden to make reasonable arrangements for the compensa-
tion of such agents and representatives. 8s Second, the warrantor
may not disclaim nor limit the duration of implied warranties.8 9
Third, any limitation or exclusion of consequential damages for
breach of the written9" or implied warranties must appear con-
spicuously "on the face" of the warranty. 91 Fourth, if the warran-
Full Warranties On Consumer Products." 41 Fed. Reg. 22,099 (1976) (to be codified in 16
C.F.R. §§ 704.1-.3). Due to the lack of requests for presentations respecting this proposed
rule, the FTC cancelled scheduled public hearings on the matter. 41 Fed. Reg. 32,911
(1976).
85 The term "without charge," as used in this section and § 102(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2302(c)
(Supp. V 1975), is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2304(d) (Supp. V 1975) to mean that "the war-
rantor may not assess the consumer for any costs the warrantor or his representatives incur
in connection with the required remedy of a warranted consumer product." As to "inciden-
tal" expenses, this subsection states:
An obligation under [§ 2304(a)(1)] . . . to remedy without charge does not neces-
sarily require the warrantor to compensate the consumer for incidental expenses;
however, if any incidental expenses are incurred because the remedy is not made
within a reasonable time or because the warrantor imposed an unreasonable duty
upon the consumer as a condition of securing remedy, then the consumer shall be
entitled to recover reasonable incidental expenses which are so incurred in any
action against the warrantor.
Id. (The ellipsis in the quoted language removes a citation error in the statute.) If a war-
ranted consumer product has utility only when installed, then installation must also be pro-
vided "without charge." Interpretations, supra note 1, § 700.9, 41 Fed. Reg. 34,654, 34,656
(1976). Similarly, installation of component parts must also be provided "without charge."
15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4) (Supp. V 1975).
86 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975). The FTC may by rule define in detail the
nature of the warrantor's obligations under § 2304(a). Id. § 2304(b)(3).
87 Id. § 2307. This is typical where dealerships are involved, as in the sale of new
automobiles. The manufacturer is a warrantor and the dealer is an agent or representative
for the fulfillment of warranty obligations.
8 8 
Id.
89 Id. § 2304(a)(2).
90 Express warranties that are not written warranties under the Act will not fall within
the ambit of this provision. See notes 43-57 and accompanying text supra. Theoretically, a
separate exclusion or limitation of consequential damages for breaches of express warran-
ties that are not "written warranties" under the Act could be "buried in the fine print"
and still be effective under UCC § 2-719(3). However, a modern court is not likely to give
effect to such a provision in light of the clear public policy against such hidden clauses.
9' 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975); cf. UCC § 2-719(3) (requiring only con-
scionability). Under the Code, a contract term can be conspicuous even if it is not on the
"face" of a document. See note 80 supra. The FTC has claimed authority under § 110 of
the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (Supp. V 1975), to police against deceptive warranty practices by
requiring that warrantors who make limited warranties also inform consumers of exclu-
sions of consequential damages by a conspicuous disclosure on the face of the warranty.
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tor's efforts to cure defects are unavailing after a "reasonable"
number of attempts,92 the consumer has a right to elect a refund
or a replacement93 without charge.94 Finally, the warrantor may
impose only a few limited duties on the consumer as conditions of
the warranty. 95 Nevertheless, a consumer's misuse of the product
vitiates the full warranty. 96 A written warranty that does not meet
Enforcement Policy, pt. 7, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,721, 25,723 (1975). This conspicuity-plus re-
quirement supplements, but does not supplant, the requirement under UCC § 2-719(3) of
conscionability for exclusions of consequential damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(1), (2)(B)
(Supp. V 1975); Enforcement Policy, pt. 7, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,721, 25,723 (1975). Further-
more, the use of an exclusion that is unenforceable will be regarded as deceptive under
§ l10(c) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(c) (Supp. V 1975), or § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. V 1975). Enforcement Policy, pt. 7, 40 Fed. Reg.
25,721, 25,723 (1975).
92 15 U.S.C § 2304(a)(4) (Supp. V 1975) specifically empowers the FTC to establish
rules specifying just how many attempts to cure a breach are "reasonable" with respect to
various types of consumer products. See also id. § 2304(b)(3).
93 See note 84 supra.
94 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4) (Supp. V 1975) (the so-called "anti-lemon" provision). See
note 85 supra. Although § 2304(a)(4) applies to full warranties only, the FTC could use its
authority under § 2302(b)(3) to relieve, to some extent, consumers who purchase "lemons"
under limited warranties. This provision authorizes the Commission to prescribe rules for
the extension of the duration of limited warranties when consumers are forced to spend
large amounts of time seeking repairs.
9- 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. V 1975). For example, the FTC has taken the posi-
tion that warrantors offering full warranties on consumer products cannot follow the com-
mon practice of conditioning the effectiveness of the warranty on the consumer's return of a
warranty registration card. Interpretations, supra note 1, § 700.7(b), 41 Fed. Reg. 34,654,
34,656 (1976). On the other hand, warranty registration cards may be offered to consumers
purchasing consumer products under full warranties as a convenient and optional method of
proving the date of purchase. The warrantor is obligated to inform the consumer that fail-
ure to return the card does not affect his rights under the warranty so long as he can show
when the product was purchased. Id. § 700.7(c). Since § 104(b)(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(1)-
(2) (Supp. V 1975), does not cover limited warranties, the "limited warrantor" may require
return of a registration card. "Full warrantors" may also impose obligations other than
notification of defects in the product if "the warrantor has demonstrated in a rulemaking
proceeding, or can demonstrate in an administrative or judicial enforcement proceeding
(including private enforcement), or in an informal dispute settlement proceeding, that such
a duty is reasonable." Id. § 2304(b)(1). Notwithstanding these provisions, a warrantor may
condition refund or replacement under a full warranty on receiving the product free of
liens and other encumbrances, except to the extent that the FTC by rule provides other-
wise for reasons of practicality. Id. § 2304(b)(2).
" The warrantor's obligations under a full warranty are abrogated
if he can show that the defect, malfunction, or failure of any warranted consumer
product to conform with a written warranty, was caused by damage (not resulting
from defect or malfunction) while in the possession of the consumer, or unrea-
sonable use (including failure to provide reasonable and necessary maintenance).
15 U.S.C. § 2304(c) (Supp. V 1975). "Reasonable and necessary maintenance" means per-
formance of "those operations (A) which the consumer reasonably can be expected to per-
form or have performed and (B) which are necessary to keep any consumer product per-
forming its intended function and operating at a reasonable level of performance." Id.
§ 2301(9).
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all of the foregoing requirements is a limited warranty. 9r
Under the Code, buyers and sellers have the general power,
subject to the provisions on unconscionability, reasonableness, and
minimally adequate remedies,98 to custom-design the remedies that
will be available for breaches of warranty; they may also provide
that resort to a particular remedy is to be "exclusive." 99 More spe-
cifically, the UCC allows the parties to limit the buyer's remedy to
"return of the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and
replacement of non-conforming goods or parts."1 ' In contrast,
subject to the "basis of the bargain" requirement, the Act elevates
an "undertaking in writing . . . to refund, repair, replace, or take
other remedial action"'' from the status of an "agreed"'1 2 remedy
to the status of a warranty which, if broken, gives the consumer a
right to a remedy fixed by the statute. 10 3 Therefore, if a warrantor
attempts to limit his liability for breach of warranty to repair, re-
fund, or replacement, and the transaction-is subject to the Act,
"Id. § 2303(a)(2).
"8 See UCC §§ 2-302, 2-718, 2-719.
991d. §§ 2-718, 2-719(1)(a)-(b). The presumption is that the buyer's remedies are
cumulative, not exclusive, unless the parties clearly express a contrary intention. See, e.g.,
Curtis v. Murphy Elevator Co., 407 F. Supp. 940, 947-48 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
100 UCC § 2-719(1)(a).
101 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(B) (Supp. V 1975)
102 The expression "agreed remedy" is an appropriate description of a commercial
contract where the buyer and the seller actually negotiate the terms of the agreement.
"Imposed remedy" is a more fitting term in the typical consumer transaction in which the
seller insists on the use of his printed form contract and maintains an unbending take-it-
or-leave-it attitude.
103 If the obligation to remedy is part of a full warranty (15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1) (Supp.
V 1975); see notes 82-97 and accompanying text supra), then the consumer's primary
remedy is his right to elect either replacement or refund (15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4) (Supp. V
1975); see notes 84-86 and accompanying text supra). If this does not result in sufficient
relief, the next step would be to use any available informal dispute resolution procedure.
See notes 135-41 and accompanying text infra. When all else fails, the consumer can sue
the warrantor under 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)-(e) (Supp. V 1975). However, the consumer's
state law remedies under the UCC remain intact and available at all times. See note 138
and accompanying text infra.
It has long been common for the manufacturer of "40,000-mile" tires, "36-month"
batteries, and similar products to limit the consumer's remedy for a breach of warranty to
a pro rata discount against the consumer's purchase of a replacement. Although this is not
permissible under a full warranty (see 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(1), (4) (Supp. V 1975)), the Act
does not specifically proscribe this practice in connection with limited warranties. Nothing
in the Act imposes a duty to "remedy" (see id. § 2301(10)) breaches of limited warranties.
But if a warrantor generally cannot condition a warranty on the tie-in purchase of a sec-
ond product (id. § 2302(c)), there is no apparent reason why a consumer should be de-
prived of the warranty protection he has already paid for along with the original purchase
when he declines to buy another product from the same manufacturer. A consumer
should not be required to sacrifice either his warranty protection or his free choice in the
marketplace. See notes 77-78 and accompanying text supra.
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then the warrantor has created, albeit unintentionally, a written
warranty under the Act.' 4
The power to limit or exclude consequential damages for
breach of warranty under the UCC is circumscribed only by the
requirement of conscionability. 10 5 If a warrantor gives a full war-
ranty under the Act, a requirement of conspicuity is added. 0 6 The
Act does not expressly impose a similar conspicuity requirement on
limitations of consequential damages in cases of limited warranties.
Fortunately for consumers, the FTC may have the authority to re-
quire conspicuity in such cases .117 The terms and conditions of ser-
vice contracts must be "fully, clearly, and conspicuously disclose[d]"
in "simple and readily understood language.' '1 8 Arguably, any
provision in a service contract limiting or excluding consequential
damages must be conspicuously disclosed to the consumer.
D. Privity Rules
The Act significantly changes the privity rules in the less
progressive jurisdictions.'? 9 Warranty obligations under the Act
run to the "consumer,""'" a term defined in section 101(3) of the
Act"' as:
a buyer (other than for purposes of resale) of any consumer
product, any person to whom such product is transferred during
the duration of an implied or written warranty (or service con-
14See notes 70-81 and accompanying text supra. When the warranty is subject to both
the Act and the Code the warrantor can evidently limit his Code liability at the expense of
making a written warranty under the Act.
105 UCC § 2-719(3).
106 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975). Id. § 2311(b)(2)(B) provides that "[n]othing
in this chapter (other than sections 2308 and 2304(a)(2) and (4) of this title) shall ...
supersede any provision of State law regarding consequential damages for injury to the
person or other injury." Therefore, § 2304(a)(3) does not supersede UCC § 2-719(3); it
only adds the requirement of conspicuity in cases of full warranties. See Enforcement Pol-
icy, pt. 7, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,721, 25,723 (1975).
107 The FTC has already taken the position that such power is an incident of its au-
thority under 15 U.S.C. § 2310(c) (Supp. V 1975) to police against deceptive warranty prac-
tices. Enforcement Policy, pt. 7, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,721, 25,723 (1975). See note 91 supra.
108 15 U.S.C. § 2306(b) (Supp. V 1975). This section became effective July 4, 1975.
Enforcement Policy, pt. 9, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,721, 25,723 (1975). The FTC was given-but
has not yet exercised-authority to make rules governing the manner and form of such
disclosures. 15 U.S.C. § 2306(a) (Supp. V 1975).
1'9 For a discussion of state law privity rules under the UCC, see J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, Supra note 31, §§ 11-1 to 11-6.
o See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302(a), 2308(a) (Supp. V 1975).
'Id. § 2301(3). The following definitional cross-references are relevant: 15 U.S.C.
§ 2301(1) ("consumer product"); § 2301(5) ("warrantor"); § 2301(6) ("written warranty");
§ 2301(7) ("implied warranty"); § 2301(8) ("service contract"); § 2301(15) ("State" and
"State law").
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tract) applicable to the product, and any other person who is
entitled by the terms of such warranty (or service contract) or
under applicable State law to enforce against the warrantor (or
service contractor) the obligations of the warranty (or service
contract).
A buyer "other than for purposes of resale" is the first purchaser at
retail. This removes any question of lack of "vertical privity" be-
tween a warrantor and the first retail purchaser." 2 This also ex-
cludes retailers from the protection of the Act.113 Retail sellers and
other "middlemen" must look only to the UCC and other applica-
ble state law for their own warranty protection." 4 Under the Act,
warranty obligations remain in force when the first purchaser
transfers the product to someone else during the warranty period.
The Act does not specify that the transfer must be of any particu-
lar type, so warranty obligations probably extend to the first
112 In contrast, under state law, despite a trend toward relaxation of the vertical privity
requirements, especially in consumer cases (see, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc.,
548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976)), the vertical privity requirement remains problematical for
warranty plaintiffs in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68
N.J. 1, 342 A.2d 181 (1975) (unsuccessful action for refund of purchase price of defective
camera).
113 Some might argue that the use of the term "buyer" rather than the term "con-
sumer" in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(A) (Supp. V 1975) indicates that "written warranties" can
run to retailers. But note that the Act is a consumer protection measure. It is not com-
prehensive and it is neither designed nor equipped to govern all aspects of mercantile
sales. Also, the Act is not a response to the inadequacies of the UCC as a body of
commercial law. The term "buyer for purposes other than resale," which is used in the
language following clause (B) of § 2301(6), is more appropriate here than the term "con-
sumer" because it is only the first purchaser at retail, not all "consumers," who can make
warranties part of the "basis of the bargain" at the time of the sale. The omission of the
phrase "for purposes other than resale" after the word "buyer" in § 2301(6)(A) may be a
drafting error. See also id. § 2304(b)(4).
An alternative explanation would be that the final clause of § 2301(6) is set out to the
left-hand margin so that it modifies both sub-paragraphs (A) and (B) of the definition.
This construction was suggested in an informal opinion of an FTC staff member. Letter
from Lawrence Kanter to William R. Kutner, June 2, 1976 (on file with the Cornell Law
Review).
114 Those who buy specifically for the purpose of resale will necessarily want to buy
only "merchantable" goods. See UCC § 2-314(2). The typical sale of a consumer product
involves several potential warranty relationships: retailer-consumer, manufacturer-retailer,
manufacturer-consumer, component supplier-manufacturer, and, sometimes, component
supplier-consumer. The relationships of the manufacturer with his component suppliers
and his retailers are governed by the UCC or other applicable state law (see note 17 supra),
not the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. See note 113 supra. However, component suppliers,
manufacturers, and retailers are all "merchants" within the meaning of UCC § 2-104(1) (see
note 13 supra) and each can realistically be expected to protect himself in dealing with the
others. For this reason, warranties relevant to such relationships will not be considered
here. In most cases, however, each will have to consider his relationship with the first
purchaser at retail (and other "consumers"). See text accompanying note 111 supra.
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purchaser's transferee, whether the transfer is a gift, a gratuitous
loan, a bailment for hire, or a "casual" or "isolated" sale. 1 5 Any
person qualifying as a third-party beneficiary of a warranty under
state law, 1 6 which may be quite liberal,1 17 is a covered "consumer"
under the Act. Thus, the horizontal privity requirement is largely
governed by state law, while the vertical privity requirement is
controlled by the Act. Finally, any "other person" to whom a war-
rantor may choose to extend the coverage of a warranty is also
included.""
These privity rules pertain to breaches of any written or im-
plied warranty or service contract covered by the Act that result in
economic losses or property damage; a special rule governs per-
sonal injury claims. Section 11 l(b)(2)(A) 119 provides that "[n]dthing
in this title (other than sections 108 and 104(a)(2) and (4)) shall...
affect the liability of, or impose liability on, any person for personal
injury . . . ." As discussed earlier, 120 sections 108 and 104(a)(2)
provide that: (1) if any written warranty is given, implied warran-
ties may not be disclaimed; (2) if the written warranty is a "full"
one, no time limit may be imposed on the duration of implied
warranties; and (3) if the written warranty is a "limited" one, there
may, under certain circumstances, be a durational limit imposed
upon implied warranties. However, the relevance of section
104(a)(4) to section 111(b)(2)(A) is not obvious. Section 104(a)(4)
requires a "full warrantor" who is unable to repair a defective
consumer product to allow the consumer to elect a remedy.' 2 1 Sec-
tion 104(b)(4) of the Act 12 2 provides that "[t]he duties under sub-
115 Although a full warranty may not expressly restrict the rights of a transferee dur-
ing its stated duration, Interpretations, supra note 1, § 700.6(b), 41 Fed. Reg. 34,654,
34,656 (1976), the duration of the full warranty itself can be limited to the time that the
product is owned by the first purchaser or used in conjunction with another product. Id.
§ 700.6(c). This suggests that a warrantor cannot deny the transferee's rights under a full
warranty when the transfer is a bailment or loan, since ownership does not change. Be-
cause the consumer may be led to believe that no proof of purchase will be required, no
such proof may be required. Id. An example of this type of limitation is a full warranty on
an automotive battery "for as long as you own your car."
116 See UCC § 2-313, Comment 2; § 2-318.
117 See Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974), overruling
Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963). Essentially, Salvador
transforms PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-318 (Purdon 1970), which corresponds to UCC
§ 2-318 Alternative A, into Alternative B.
Is 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3) (Supp. V 1975). Thus, agreement of the parties may expand,
but not contract, warranty protection.
119 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
120 See notes 70-81, 89 and accompanying text supra.
121 See notes 84-86 and accompanying text supra.
122 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(4) (Supp. V 1975).
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section [104(a)] extend from the warrantor to each person who is a
consumer with respect to the consumer product." Evidently, in
light of section 11 1(b)(2)(A), a violation of section 104(a)(4) that
results in personal injury to anyone who is a consumer with respect
to a particular consumer product, creates a federal cause of action
under the Act for the First purchaser, his transferee, or anyone
who is a third-party beneficiary of the warranty under state law or
the terms of the warranty, without regard to traditional privity
rules. In contrast, the first purchaser's vendee is virtually certain to
be barred under state law from recovery against his vendor's war-
rantor for want of privity.
Distinct from the question of to whom a warranty runs, but
equally important, is the question of from whom a warranty runs.
Under the Act, warranty obligations run from a "warrantor,'
' 2 3
who is defined as "any supplier or other person who gives or offers
to give a written warranty or who is or may be obligated under an
implied warranty.' 1 24 A "supplier" is "any person engaged in the
business of making a consumer product directly or indirectly avail-
able to consumers."'1 25 Therefore, "suppliers" includes "among
others, all persons in the chain of production and distribution of a
consumer product including the producer or manufacturer, com-
ponent supplier, wholesaler, distributor, and retailer.'' 2 6 However,
section 110(f) of the Act 12 7 provides that, for purposes of en-
forcement under the Act,12 8 "only the warrantor actually making a
written affirmation of fact, promise, or undertaking shall be
123 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302(a), 2303(a), 2304(a) (Supp. V 1975).
124 1d. § 2301(5).
2S Id. § 2301(4).
126 H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1974), reprinted in (1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEws 7702, 7717.
127 15 U.S.C. § 2310(f) (Supp. V 1975). Interpretations, supra note 1, § 700.4, 41 Fed.
Reg. 34,654, 34,655 (1976) provides:
Section 110(f) of the Act provides that only the supplier "actually making" a
written warranty is liable for purposes of FTC and private enforcement of the
Act. A supplier who does no more than distribute or sell a consumer product
covered by a written warranty offered by another person or business and which
identifies that person or business as the warrantor is not liable for failure of the
written warranty to comply with the Act or rules thereunder. However, other ac-
tions and written and oral representations of such a supplier in connection with
the offer or sale of a warranted product may obligate that supplier under the Act.
Suppliers are advised to consult state law to determine those actions and represen-
tations which may make them co-warrantors, and therefore obligated under the
warranty.
The matter of oral representations seems to be exclusively within the province of state law.
See notes 44-46 and accompanying text supra.
128 See 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (Supp. V 1975).
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deemed to have created a written warranty . . . ." Thus a
manufacturer's written warranty can be enforced by civil action
under section 110 only against the manufacturer, not the retailer.
Of course, a retailer may, in such cases, be subject to warranty
liability under the Code. In contrast, in cases where a component
manufacturer gives a written warranty to the first purchaser at
retail, as is often the case with the tires on a new automobile, there
is no bar to an action under section 110 for want of privity. 129 In
such cases either the manufacturer or the retailer may also incur
warranty liability under the UCC.
An implied warranty, for purposes of the Act, is one that arises
under state law (as modified by the Act).' 30 Remote sellers, such as
component manufacturers, may have no implied warranty liability
to consumers even when they make written warranties under the
Act because implied warranties might not arise in such cases.' 3' On
the other hand, the policy of the Act favors meaningful warranties
on consumer products.13 2 In light of this clearly enunciated con-
gressional policy, judges and legislators in the less progressive
jurisdictions may be more apt to relax the strictness of traditional
privity rules-at least in cases involving consumer products or
consumer-buyers.
129 Interpretations, supra note 1, § 700.3(d), 41 Fed. Reg. 34,654, 34,655 (1976) pro-
vides in part:
Many consumer products are covered by warranties which are neither in-
tended for, nor enforceable by, consumers. A common example is a warranty
given by a component supplier to a manufacturer of consumer products. (The
manufacturer may, in turn, warrant these components to consumers.) The com-
ponent supplier's warranty is generally given solely to the product manufacturer,
and is neither intended to be conveyed to the consumer nor brought to the
consumer's attention in connection with a sale. Such waranties [sic] are not subject
to the Act, since a written warranty under Section 101(6) of the Act [15 U.S.C.
§ 2301(6)] must become "part of the bais of the bargain between a supplier and a
buyer for purposes other than resale." However[,J the Act applies to a component
supplier's warranty in writing which is given to the consumer. An example is a
supplier's written warranty to the consumer covering a refrigerator that is sold
installed in a boat or recreational vehicle. The supplier of the refrigerator relies
on the boat or vehicle assembler to convey the written agreement to the consumer.
In this case, the supplier's written warranty is to a consumer, and is covered by
the Act.
13 See notes 61-63 and accompanying text supra.
"'See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81,
240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963) (action for wrongful death of airplane passenger not maintainable
against manufacturer of plane's altimeter).
"' Elimination of the warrantor's power to disclaim implied warranties is evidence of
this policy. See notes 74-75 and accompanying textsupra. This is reinforced by the designa-
tion and disclosure requirements (see notes 71-73 and accompanying text supra & notes
133-34 and accompanying text infra) and the congressional statement of purposes in 15
U.S.C. § 2302(a) (Supp. V 1975).
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E. Miscellaneous Features
The Act creates a sophisticated disclosure scheme that re-
quires warrantors to reveal, before the consummation of a sale, the
nature and limits of their obligations to the consumer. 3 3 Similar
obligations are imposed on service contractors. l 4 The UCC lacks
an analogous requirement.
The general rule under the UCC is that, unless the Code
otherwise provides, the parties have a right to go to court to en-
force the terms of their bargain. 3 5 Under the Act, Congress has
"declare[d] it to be its policy to encourage warrantors to establish
procedures whereby consumer disputes are fairly and expedi-
tiously settled through informal dispute settlement mecha-
nisms."'1 36 Consumers may even be obligated to pursue informal
remedies before going to court to enforce their rights under
the Act.' 37 Of course, the consumer may still pursue his UCC
remedies in court without first resorting to any available or com-
133 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a), (b)(1) (Supp. V 1975); 16 C.F.R. §§ 701.1-702.3 (1976). The
rules became effective December 31, 1976, as to products manufactured after that date. 15
U.S.C. § 2312(b) (Supp. V 1975); Interpretations, supra note 1, § 700.12, 41 Fed. Reg.
34,654, 34,657 (1976); 40 Fed. Reg. 60,168, 60,188 (1975), as amended, 41 Fed. Reg. 4,814
(1976). Section 102(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (Supp. V 1975), calls for disclosure
"to the extent required by rules of the [FTC]." Thus, although the provisions of § 102 of
the Act apply only to consumer products "actually costing the consumer more than $5" (15
U.S.C. § 2302(e) (Supp. V 1975)), the FTC rules require disclosure only as to products
actually costing the consumer more than $15. 16 C.F.R. §§ 701.2, .3(a) (1976). The
minimum cost reqqirements for applicability of the statute to goods sold in multiple pack-
aging are set forth in Enforcement Policy, pt. 2, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,721, 25,722 (1975). Pre-
sumably the same rules will govern goods sold in multiple packaging for purposes of 16
C.F.R. § 701.3(a) (1976).
Under § 11 1(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 231 1(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975), a state law requirement of
labeling or disclosure with respect to written warranties or performance thereunder, which
is not identical to the federal statute and the rules implementing it, is superseded and
rendered inapplicable to written warranties governed by §§ 2302-2304. However, the FTC
may grant exceptions where the state requirements give consumers greater protection and
no undue burden on interstate commerce would result. Id. § 2311(c)(2). California has
made an application for such an exception and the FTC has invited comments. 41 Fed.
Reg. 28,361 (1976).
Perhaps the most esoteric FTC pronouncement in this connection is Part 11 of the
Enforcement Policy, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,721, 25,723-24 (1975), relating to the use of warranty
materials printed before the Act became law. This Part specifies how such warranties may
be physically modified or superseded by additional materials. It may be important to a few
major manufacturers.
134 15 U.S.C. § 2306(b) (Supp. V 1975). The FTC has not yet exercised its power
under § 2306(a) to promulgate rules prescribing "the manner and form in which the terms
and conditions of service contracts shall be fully, clearly, and conspicuously disclosed."
135 UCC § 1-106(2).
136 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
13 7 Id. § 2310(a)(3).
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pulsory informal dispute resolution procedures. 138 The FTC is
given broad rulemaking power 139 and supervisory authority140 in
this area, and warrantors are required to disclose to consumers the
nature of such procedures in advance of any contemplated sale of
a consumer product.
14
Section 110(d) of the Act 42 creates a federal civil cause of
action for consumers who are damaged by the failure of a warran-
tor, supplier, or service contractor to comply with the requirements
of the Act or the terms of a written or implied warranty or service
contract. Federal district courts and competent state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction, 43 but it will be far more difficult to obtain
federal jurisdiction. 44 The availability of consumer remedies is
fixed by the statute and not subject to the contrary agreement of
the parties. 45 These remedies include compensatory damages,
"other legal and equitable relief,'1 46 and possibly incidental ex-
penses, 147 court costs, and attorneys' fees.' 48 In contrast, the UCC
makes no provision for court costs or attorneys' fees. 149 Addition-
ally, the warrantor cannot impose restrictions on the remedies
available to the disappointed or injured consumer, which repre-
sents a significant advance.' 50
Finally, although parties are generally permitted to shape their
own deals under the UCC,' 5 1 the Act is a regulatory law that gives
the FTC broad authority to police the activities of those who offer
13sSee id. § 2311(b)(1). But the relative expense may make this a seldom-exercised
right. The exorbitant cost of litigation today was probably a major impetus for the enact-
ment of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. See id. § 2310(a)(1).
139Id. § 2310(a)(2); Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. §§ 703.1-.8
(1976) (effective July 4, 1976). This rule is not effective until May 1, 1977 insofar as it
applies to equipment installed in new homes for sale. 41 Fed. Reg. 47,914 (1976).
140 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(4) (Supp. V 1975). The Commission may take action to review
the operation of a warrantor's dispute procedure sua sponte, but must take action upon
"written complaint filed by any interested person." Id.
141 Id. § 2302(a)(8); 16 C.F.R. §§ 701.3(a)(6), 702.1-.3, 703.2(b)-(c) (1976).
142 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d) (Supp. V 1975).
143 Id. § 2310(d)(1)(A)-(B).
144 See id. § 2310(d)(3).
145 Id. §§ 2304(a)(4), 2310(d)(1)-(2); see Interpretations, supra note 1, § 700.8, 41 Fed.
Reg. 34,654, 34,656 (1976).
146 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
147 1d § 2304(d).
148 Id. § 2310(d)(2).
149 The Act's provision for costs and counsel fees has a double effect: it helps the
disappointed or injured consumer and gives warrantors an added incentive to carry into
effect Congress' announced policy favoring the establishment of informal warranty dispute
resolution procedures. See note 136 and accompanying textsupra.
'
15See notes 11-12 and accompanying textsupra.
"' See notes 6-14 and accompanying text supra.
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warranties on consumer products. 52 Title II of the Act 53 signifi-
cantly expands the powers of the Commission. The FTC's jurisdic-
tion now embraces transactions that merely affect interstate
commerce.' 54 In addition, the Act directs the FTC to prescribe
rules under some sections' 55 and gives it discretion to establish
rules under other sections.' 5 6 The FTC is also authorized to prom-
ulgate model warranty clauses that warrantors may incorporate
by reference.' 57 Both the Attorney General 58 and the FTC are em-
powered 59 to bring suits to enjoin deceptive warranty practices
60
152 15 U.S.C. § 2310(b) (Supp. V 1975) makes it a violation of the Federal Trade
Commission Act § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975), to violate Title I of the Act
or rules prescribed thereunder. The penalty for each violation can be a fine of I0,000. 15
U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
153 Tide II of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improve-
ment Act, §§ 201-207, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 46, 49, 50, 52, 56, 57a-57c, 58 (Supp. V 1975).
154 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 46, 52, 57a (Supp. V 1975). See note 30 and accompanying text
supra.
155 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (disclosure of warranty terms); § 2302(b)(1)(A) (pre-sale avail-
ability of terms); § 2310(a)(2) (minimum standards for informal dispute resolution proce-
dures) (Supp. V 1975); Enforcement Policy, pt. 13, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,721, 25,724 (1975); see
15 U.S.C. § 2312(c) (Supp. V 1975) (one-year deadline for promulgation of rules). The
FTC was also directed to "initiate" a rulemaking proceeding for warranties on used au-
tomobiles no later than January 4, 1976. 15 U.S.C. § 2309(b) (Supp. V 1975). Such a
proceeding was initiated. See Disclosure and Other Regulations Concerning the Sale of
Used Motor Vehicles, §§ 455.1(e)-(g), .2(f)-(g), .3, 41 Fed. Reg. 1089-90 (1976), as corrected,
41 Fed. Reg. 2100 (1976) (to be codified as 16 C.F.R. §§ 455.1(e)-(g), .2(f)-(g), .3). The lan-
guage of this section of the Act seems to delegate to the Commission authority to create sub-
stantive rules, as necessary, to expand the Act's protection of consumers of used automobiles.
The FTC has not yet indicated its construction of this apparent delegation of authority.
This may be fertile ground for litigation.
156 The FTC has discretionary authority to establish rules under 15 U.S.C. § 2301(12)
(depreciation deductions for refunds under full warranties); § 2302(b)(1)(B) (disclosure
of warranty information in advertising, labeling, point-of-sale materials, and other repre-
sentations in writing); § 2302(b)(3) (extension of duration of warranties when consumer
is deprived of use and enjoyment of a consumer product for excessive time due to failure
of product to meet terms of warranty or failure of warrantor to perform his obligations);
§ 2302(d) (boilerplate warranty provisions); § 2303(c) (exemptions from statutory designa-
tion requirements); § 2304(a)(4), (b)(1), (b)(3) (standards of reasonableness for (1) time for
effecting remedy under a full warranty under § 2304(a)(1); (2) maximum number of at-
tempts to repair a defective consumer product under a full warranty before a consumer
must be allowed to elect a refund or replacement under § 2304(a)(4); and (3) duties im-
posed upon consumers making claims for remedies under full warranties under § 2306(b)(1));
§ 2304(b)(2) (elimination of liens and encumbrances where replacements or refunds are
given under full warranties); § 2304(b)(3) (duties of warrantors under § 2304(a)); and
§ 2306(a) (disclosure of terms and conditions of service contracts) (Supp. V 1975). All FTC
rulemaking under the Act must comply with the procedures specified in 15 U.S.C. § 2309(a)
(Supp. V 1975). In addition, all FTC rules so created are specifically made subject to judi-
cial review. Id.
157 Id. § 2302(d).




16 "Id. § 2310(c)(2). The FTC has taken the position that it is a deceptive warranty
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and to compel compliance with the Act.'61 Finally, the FTC has
power to review, either sua sponte or upon complaint, the opera-
tion of any informal dispute resolution procedures.1
62
II
PLANNING WARRANTIES AND RESOLVING DISPUTES
A. From the Warrantor's Point of View
Many factors make it impossible to draft an omnibus warranty
provision that can be used by all suppliers in all consumer transac-
tions. First, terms that are clearly sensible for a relatively expensive
and complex item, such as an automobile, may not be practical or
even desirable for a simpler, more modest item, such as an electric
alarm clock. Second, terms that are appropriate for inherently
dangerous items may be inappropriate for other consumer prod-
ucts. The conduct of the other suppliers in the chain of distribu-
tion is a third factor. For instance, a retailer may be better advised
to refrain from giving a written warranty and to disclaim all im-
plied warranties because the manufacturer has already given a full
written warranty. On the other hand, it may be a good business
practice to offer a warranty when a competitor does. These consid-
erations are intended only as illustrations; the list is not exhaustive.
A potential warrantor should consider these questions. First: Is
the transaction subject to the Act? Only sales of consumer products
affecting interstate commerce are within the scope of the Act.'
63
Second: What state law is applicable to the transaction? At least
practice to lead a consumer to believe that certain terms and conditions of a sale are en-
forceable under the Act although they are not written warranties, such as a consumer's
right to return a product within a certain time for a complete refund (without regard to
whether it is defective). Interpretations, supra note 1, § 700.3(b)-(c), 41 Fed. Reg. 34,654,
34,655 (1976). The warrantor cannot include in his warranty any statement to the effect
that his decision is final or that he alone shall determine what constitutes a defect under
the agreement. Id. § 700.8, 41 Fed. Reg. 34,654, 34,656 (1976). Additionally, warrantors
may not use express limitations or exclusions that are not enforceable. Enforcement Pol-
icy, pt. 7, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,721, 25,723 (1975).
161 15 U.S.C. § 2310(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
1
62 See note 140 supra.
..3 See notes 18-31 and accompanying text supra. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301(5) and 2310(c)(1)
(Supp. V 1975) suggest that the FTC's power to police against deceptive warranty practices
is limited to written and implied warranties covered by the Act. A more liberal approach
might find FTC authority to police against deceptive warranty practices as soon as inter-
state commerce is affected. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975) (proscribes unfair




some state law will always apply, usually the UCC. 6 4 Clearly, the
possibility of choice-of-law planning should not be overlooked.1
5
Third: Should a written warranty be given? If a written warranty is
not given, the supplier can: (1) disclaim and exclude warranties to
the fullest extent that the applicable version of the UCC will per-
mit; (2) choose not to disclose in advance of the sale or thereafter
the terms of any warranties and disclaimers or the nature of the
warrantor's obligations thereunder; and (3) limit consumers'
remedies in accordance with the relevant Code sections.' 66 Fourth:
If a written warranty is given, should a "full" or "limited" warranty
be given?' 6 ' If a full warranty is given, the supplier can exploit the
value of advertisements boasting of "full warranties" that meet the
new "federal minimum standards" for warranties. However, no
limit may be imposed on the duration of implied warranties, the
power to impose duties on the consumer as conditions of the war-
ranty is severely limited, and the consumer is entitled to either a
speedy and effective remedy for any breach of the warranty or a
right to elect replacement or a refund. 6 ' If a limited warranty is
given, the pejorative connotation many consumers associate with
the term "limited" must be accepted, but it becomes possible to
impose greater duties on the consumer and, under certain circum-
stances, to limit the duration of implied warranties. 69 Fifth:
Should service contracts be offered in conjunction with or in lieu of
written warranties? The use of a service contract alone eliminates
the power to limit the duration of implied warranties, 7 1 so the
only benefit to be gained by using a service contract alone is the
consideration the consumer pays for the contract. However, service
contracts may be used in conjunction with written warranties, and,
if a service contract is combined with a limited warranty, the dura-
tion of implied warranties apparently may, under certain circum-
164 See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
165 See note 31 supra.
166 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302, 2308 (Supp. V 1975); UCC §§ 2-316, 2-718, 2-719.
167 Either way, (1) the supplier is subject to the Act's disclosure and designation re-
quirements; (2) implied warranties cannot be disclaimed; (3) consumers may be compelled
to follow prescribed informal dispute resolution procedures before resorting to litigation
under the Act; (4) limitations of consequential damages must be conspicuous (as well as
conscionable); (5) the warrantor is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to cure defects in
the product; and (6) product or service tie-in arrangements are generally not permitted. 15
U.S.C. §§ 2302(a),(c), 2303, 2304(a)(3), 2308(a), 2310(a)(3),(e) (Supp. V 1975); Enforce-
ment Policy, pt. 7, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,721, 25,723 (1975).
168 15 U.S.C. §§ 2304(a)(1)-(2),(4),(b)(1)-(2), 2308(a)-(b) (Supp. V 1975).
169d. §§ 2304(b)(1), 2308(b).
170 Id. § 2308(a)(2),(b) (negative implication).
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stances, be limited. 7' Sixth: Should the warranty specify that
repair, replacement, or refund of the actual purchase price be
the sole and exclusive remedy? This may limit Code liability, but
it usually creates a written warranty under the Act and entitles
the consumer to statutorily designated remedies. 172 When artfully
combined with a mandatory informal dispute resolution process, a
provision of this sort might help the warrantor to avoid the ex-
pense of litigation. Seventh: Is the warrantor accidentally or inten-
tionally creating any other express warranty obligations through
his advertising, packaging, or labeling?' 7 3 Even if a carefully
worded disclaimer of "other express warranties" appearing with a
warrantor's disclosure of the terms of the written warranty would
not offend the literal terms of the Act, it might amount to a "de-
ceptive practice."' 7 4 On the other hand, an appropriately worded
merger clause in the disclosure of the terms of the written war-
ranty and any writings memorializing the sale might be effective to
negate Code liability for express warranties.' 7 5 Finally, a conspicu-
ous and simply worded provision in the pre-sale disclosure of
terms, which informs the consumer that no person is authorized to
make any warranties or representations on behalf of the warrantor
making the disclosure, is advisable.' 7 6 This may make the "basis
of the bargain" requirement a more formidable obstacle for the
consumer.
B. From the Consumer's Point of View
Attorneys representing consumers must remember that war-
ranty is only one theory of recovery in products liability cases.'
77 If
' See notes 75 & 80 supra.
,,2 See notes 84 & 98-104 and accompanying text supra. Because remedies are fixed
by the statute (see note 145 and accompanying text supra), this may be a deceptive practice.
See notes 158-61 and accompanying textsupra.
" See notes 51-54 and accompanying text supra.
174 See note 160 and accompanying text supra. Whether it would survive scrutiny under
UCC § 2-316(1) is also doubtful.
1'7 See 1.]CC §§ 2-202, 2-316(l). Courts should refuse to give effect to merger clauses
and the parol evidence rule in consumer transactions,.at least to the extent that adherence
to these technical and arcane rules results in the disavowal of express warranties.
0 6 See UCC § 2-316, Comment 2. Whether any express warranties arise between the
retailer and the consumer will generally be governed by the UCC. However, if the retailer
makes warranties under the Act, then he, too, may try to exclude other express warranties
in this manner.
17" Actions may lie for negligence, strict liability in tort, and fraud or misrepresenta-
tion, either ex contractu or ex delicto. See, e.g., City Dodge, Inc. v. Gardner, 232 Ga. 766, 208
S.E.2d 794 (1974). It may also be possible to bring an action under § 23 of the Consumer
19771
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a warranty action is appropriate, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act, differing versions of the UCC, and extra-Code state law may
apply to the transaction. 178 The supplier may not have the right to
disclaim or limit the duration of implied warranties, 17 9 and conse-
quential damages may not have been effectively excluded.1
8 0
Further, if a full warranty has been given and the warrantor is
unable to effect repair after a reasonable number of attempts, then
the consumer is entitled to elect either a replacement or a
refund.' 8 ' The consumer is entitled to avail himself of any infor-
mal dispute resolution process established by the warrantor; under
certain circumstances the consumer may be compelled to resort to
such a procedure before bringing a civil action under the Act to
enforce his rights under the Act.18 2 When there is no informal
procedure, or when it has been exhausted, the consumer may have
a cause of action under the Act for damages, other legal and equi-
table relief, and possibly incidental expenses, court costs, and
attorneys' fees.18 3 The consumer is always entitled to resort to his
remedies under applicable state law-even when a compulsory in-
formal dispute resolution procedure has been established.
84
CONCLUSION
Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, manufacturers and
sellers of consumer products are not required to give warranties.
However, any supplier of consumer products who gives a "written
warranty" to a consumer or who enters into a "service contract!'
with a consumer within ninety days from the time of sale loses the
power to disclaim implied warranties arising under state law. In
addition, warrantors generally must designate their warranties as
either "full" or "limited" and they must disclose to the consumer
Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2072 (Supp. V 1975). Consumers often rest their right to
recover on several theories. See, e.g., Shotkoski v. Standard Chem. Mfg. Co., 195 Neb. 22,
237 N.W.2d 92 (1975) (express and implied warranties, negligence, and strict liability in
tort). However, an action for breach of warranty may be necessary for recovery of the
purchase price (UCC § 2-71 I(1)), recovery of damages for economic loss of the bargain
(UCC § 2-714), and for incidental and consequential losses (UCC § 2-715). The buyer's




See notes 17-31 and accompanying text supra.
179 See notes 74-75 and accompanying text supra.
' See notes 90-91 and accompanying text supra.
"I See notes 82-86, 92-94 and accompanying text supra.
182 See notes 135-37 and accompanying text supra.
'83 See notes 142-50 and accompanying text supra.
184 See note 138 and accompanying text supra.
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-prior to the sale-the terms and conditions of such warranties.
Full warranties give consumers many advantages, the most signifi-
cant being a right, not subject to the contrary "agreement" of the
parties, to elect a refund or a replacement when the warrantor is
unable to repair a defective consumer product within a reasonable
time. Congress has encouraged the creation of informal dispute
settlement mechanisms which, if established by warrantors, should
simplify and reduce the cost of the process of enforcing warranty
obligations. Finally, the FTC has been given broad power to pro-
tect consumers from deceptive warranty practices.
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is not a comprehensive
measure; it supplements, but does not supplant, the Uniform
Commercial Code. The interdependence of federal and state law
in this area injects complexity and a lack of uniformity into the
picture. This makes the planning of sellers' warranty liabilities
more difficult and more expensive.
It remains to be seen whether suppliers of consumer products
will offer full warranties, whether the FTC will zealously exercise
its enforcement powers to the fullest extent contemplated by the
Act, and whether the Act will ultimately be regarded as a boon or a
bane to the cause of consumer protection.
William R. Kutner
1977]
